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Prospects for Nuclear Non-Proliferation:
An Actor-Based Case Study of Iran’s Nuclear Future
James Martin Lockwood
ABSTRACT
This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of the Nuclear NonProliferation Regime and analyze theories for effectively analyzing countries that
are a risk for proliferating nuclear armaments. The initial phase of my research is
designed to assess the existing literature and primary theoretical approaches for
analyzing nuclear non-proliferation initiatives and potential nuclear proliferators.
My main means of analysis will be to examine the national and international
actors involved in each case. With this method, I plan to analyze a government at
the level of each of its ruling institutions. Each of these institutions will be
analyzed in the context of Joseph Cirincione’s five drivers and barriers: security,
prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics. This study will then
review multiple historical cases of countries and treaties related to the nuclear
non-proliferation issue in the context of my method of analysis. In particular,
each historical study will discuss major actors and institutions with respect to the
five major proliferation concepts, as a means of demonstrating the validity of my
method. The primary section of my thesis will be the application of my method to
one of the preeminent nuclear proliferation threats today: Iran. After a discussion
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of the physical status of Iran’s nuclear program, I will begin my analysis in terms
of my concepts, and will examine the principal actors involved in the Iranian
nuclear dispute. These will be the Iran’s moderate and conservative factions, as
well as the U.S., Israel, the EU-3, and IAEA, and they will be examined in the
context of the five drivers and barriers. The final section will be my overall risk
analysis for Iran. My preliminary analysis is that regime survival is the most
critical issue when it comes to the principal motivations of a state to develop
nuclear arms. If this is correct, policy options designed to take advantage of the
actors’ positions in Iran can be formulated based on the specific conditions that
prevail in Iran.

iii

Chapter I-Introduction:
This thesis has been written to try and determine potential solutions to the
nuclear proliferation issue, and to examine the topic to explore new theoretical
approaches for ways to not only to allow for more comprehensive means of
nuclear arms reduction, but also ways to improve means of nuclear nonproliferation (stopping development of nuclear arms before they become an
issue), which would make reduction of existing arms easier and less time critical.
With this in mind, this study will be conducted as a theoretical comparison of
global methods of non-proliferation as opposed to targeted policies designed to
affect specific states or regions, and more specifically, to examine the viability of
using an institutional and actor based approach in this analysis (as opposed to a
strictly governmental analysis). The central case study of this proposed targeted
area method is a country at the forefront of the nuclear proliferation issue: Iran.
This country has the potential to pose a serious challenge to the non-proliferation
regime, and has repeatedly defied both international opinion and U.N. mandate by
obfuscating the facts about its nuclear program and purchasing components over
the black market. Its bellicose language concerning Israel and the United States
and ambitions to become the hegemonic power in the Middle East raise further
concerns about the results if Iran does develop atomic arms.

1

The case of Iran is important for a number of reasons. Iran is already a
major regional player in the Middle East, and the development of a nuclear
program by the Middle East would have a large number of significant effects.
Development of an Iranian nuclear weapon would signal demonstrate the
weakness of the existing non-proliferation regime, and cast significant doubt on
American ability to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. This could also lead
to the expansion of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East to deter Iran,
which would lead to an extremely dangerous multi-polar nuclear standoff in what
is arguably the world’s most volatile region. Finally, development of Iranian
nuclear arms would dramatically reduce American credibility in the region to
provide security, and could cause a sharp drop in American influence throughout
the Middle East. However, while the United States stands to lose a great deal by
the development of an Iranian nuclear option, Iran itself stands to lose more.
Development of its nuclear option would likely isolate Iran, cause the United
Nations to invoke sanctions, and risk a military intervention from the international
community. Iran’s pursuit of the full nuclear fuel cycle when there is little benefit
and massive cost involved has continued to confuse diplomats and analysts, and
the same is true of North Korea. This work seeks to answer one central question:
Can analysis of the major national and international actors in a given nuclear
proliferation scenario help determine why nuclear proliferator states pursue
nuclear weapons in defiance of all conventional logic? The initial hypothesis of
this work is that such states will pursue nuclear programs if that state believes that
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a nuclear option is vital to the survival of its regime, regardless of the potential
international consequences. If this is true, it should demonstrate the ability to
formulate an effective policy approach to containing a particular proliferator state.
To do this, both historical examples of challenges to the non-proliferation regime
and the current case study of Iran will first be broken down into the main actors
involved in the crisis. By examining the relationships between these actors, it
should be possible to determine the overall principal motivators for a country to
produce nuclear weapons in spite of overwhelming international objections. For
instance, the belief by the North Korean government that its nuclear weapons are
necessary to deter American military would suggest that security would be a
principal motivator. This is a simplistic example, but demonstrates the concept.
By examining how all of these actors interact within a set framework of accepted
motivators (and inhibitors) to developing nuclear arms, it is possible to determine
the overall impetus for that country to develop its nuclear program. Once this is
complete, knowledge of a state’s individual motivations, issues, actors, and
conditions will allow for the formulation of a direct policy option for dealing with
the problem state.

3

Chapter II-Literature Review:
Three primary works lie at the foundation of this thesis’ approach. These
are Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons by Joseph
Cirincione, The Future of Arms Control by Michael Levi and Michael O’Hanlon,
and The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices by
Kurt Campbell, Michael Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss. All of these books attempt
to cover different approaches of the nuclear proliferation issue, and when taken
together, they complement each other quite well. Cirincione’s book discusses the
various means by which states choose whether to pursue nuclear arms, how these
factors stem from the various institutions within a nation-state, and how the
various drivers and barriers within these institutions can result in an overall
decision by a nation state to arm itself or not. These drivers and barriers are
placed into five categories: Security, Prestige, Domestic Politics, Technology, and
Economics. 1 This follows an extensive historical study of nuclear arms and arms
control. Levi and O’Hanlon’s book focuses more on policy options than root
causes of nuclear issues, and discusses means by which the United States and the
United Nations can create a new arms control framework, as Cold War forms of

1

Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York City:
Columbia University Press, 2007), Pg. 49.
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arms control are no longer considered viable in the modern era. 2 This book
provides separate potential policies for both arms reduction and arms counterproliferation under a number of circumstances, and strongly advocates a central
American role in the improvement of the NPT regime. Finally, Campbell,
Einhorn, and Reiss’ book can in many ways be considered an extension of
Cirincione’s book, as it looks at historical and institutional factors that drive states
to seek nuclear arms. The section of the book that stands out, however, is its
series of case studies on states that have historically chosen to forgo nuclear arms
(such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea), all of which describe in
detail the reasons that those states did not pursue nuclear arms. These case
studies are exhaustive chronicles of the internal and external issues and actors that
influenced each case. However, these analyses are mostly of secondary cases (i.e.
countries that risk becoming proliferators in response to a neighboring state
developing nuclear arms) and are generally security oriented in terms of analyzing
motive. The book also provides extensive historical background as to the
previous failures (and successes) of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. 3
However, before discussing how these books complement one another, I
feel it is necessary to compare the characteristics of their studies on this issue.
First among these is a strongly U.S.-centered approach to all three of these books.
This is particularly notable in Levi and O’Hanlon’s book, and nearly all of their
2

Michael A. Levi and Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control (Washington D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2008), Pgs. 1-19.
3
Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why
States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
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suggested policy options require U.S. leadership and in some cases unilateral
American action on the issue (such as a voluntary de-emphasis of nuclear arms in
the American arsenal). 4 Cirincione also states a similar conclusion, claiming that
decisive leadership by an American president is required to return energy to the
issue, and that the support of an active and well informed public is required for
such a president to lead the international community on the issue. 5 Campbell,
Einhorn, and Reiss also put the United States at the core of the non-proliferation,
but discuss it in a different manner. The failings of previous American nonproliferation efforts are discussed at length, in addition to the risks of states under
U.S. protection (such as Taiwan or South Korea) if there is any erosion in the
confidence that the U.S. will defend those countries in a time of conflict. 6 Thus,
this book’s call for American leadership on the issue is more indirect, but it is
certainly evident. A common theme of all of these books is the idea that
American exceptionalism on the nuclear issue (meaning the idea that the United
States can, to a certain degree, retain its massive nuclear arsenal while it calls for
everyone else to disarm) has to be done away with if there is ever to be any major
progress on the non-proliferation issue on the global scale.
Another difference in approach between these works is the emphasis on
historical study in the writing. On the one hand, Levi and O’Hanlon have very
little historical background within their book, looking instead to future policy
4

Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pgs. 72-73.
Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Pgs. 158-182.
6
Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear
Choices, Pgs 20-30.
5
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options (after all, the book is titled The Future of Arms Control). The only
portion of the book that could be considered a historical analysis is a discussion of
traditional, Cold War era arms control initiatives provided for comparative
analysis. 7 By contrast, Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss take an almost entirely
historical approach to their work, as their case studies are all historical works
seeking to use past events to try and describe the possibilities for those countries
obtaining nuclear arms. 8 Furthermore, there is also a brief discussion of the
failures of existing nuclear arms control and non-proliferation policies, and how
these failures may have led to the unstable nuclear world we live in today. 9
Cirincione’s book falls somewhere in between, as he utilizes the first three
chapters of his book for historical study, emphasizing in them the events that led
to the creation of the atomic bomb, the arms race, and the Cold War. 10 He
chooses a very individual, actor-oriented approach, attempting to describe the
mentalities of people in each phase of the bomb’s development and evolution.
This is critical to his institutional theoretical approach in terms of describing the
drivers and barriers for nuclear development, as institutions are made up of
people, and understanding the mentality of people in each institution is necessary
for understanding the behavior of that institution as a whole.

7

Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pgs. 19-46.
Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear
Choices, Pgs 43-313.
9
Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear
Choices, Pgs 20-30.
10
Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Pgs. 1-48.
8
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Another area where these three works differ is the scope of their inquiries.
Cirincione takes the broadest theoretical approach, in my opinion. His discussion
of the drivers and barriers for nuclear development is largely theoretical, with
very broad application on the global level, but there is little discussion as to
applications for specific countries. Some brief examples are provided, but are not
extensive case studies. By contrast, Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss take a much
narrower approach, utilizing several smaller, narrower inquiries that are defined
by the issues of the country they study more than any broad theoretical emphasis.
Rather than trying to create an overall framework, they examine each country at
the micro-level (such as prominent individuals, security issues and economic
factors specific to each country) and investigate each country’s reasons and
rationale for considering development of nuclear arms, as well as the barrier and
other mitigating factor. However, the lack of a unified framework does leave
some inconsistencies among the case studies. Levi and O’Hanlon’s approach is
primarily theoretical, but also rather narrow, as it primarily focuses on future arms
control policy rather than the root issues that cause nuclear proliferation (a
corrective approach rather than a preventative approach), with only a short
chapter detailed to discussing the control of existing arsenals. 11 This could be
considered a major failing of the book, as it can be very easily argued that if a
country can be dissuaded from pursuing nuclear arms early on, then there is little
need to consider a corrective approach. However, this is somewhat forgivable
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Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pgs. 47-73.
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given the degree of nuclear arms that already exist in today’s international
environment, and the need for new initiatives to reduce them.
The political orientations of the authors also seem to have affected their
approaches and conclusions. This is important because it can define the overall
goal the authors want to achieve in their works, and to what degree they feel the
nuclear issue is solvable. The most conservative of these works is Levi and
O’Hanlon’s book. They express the belief that nuclear weapons cannot be
completely eliminated, and this belief results in their focus on new means of arms
control and an aggressive non-proliferation regime. 12 Conversely, Cirincione
takes a much more liberal viewpoint in his line of inquiry, as he flatly states that
he believes a nuclear-free world is a possibility and one that could be
implemented in the near future. 13 This, along with his critical assessment of the
various actors that led to the arms race and the Cold War, demonstrates a much
more liberal mind at work in the authoring of that book. Of the three works,
Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss’ book seems to be the most impartial, as it devotes
itself more to the case studies and historical reviews. While the authors clearly
express disappointment in the failures of the existing non-proliferation regime,
there are few real clues that reveal the political orientation of the writers. In that
regard, it does very well at remaining a much more analytical piece, dedicated to
historical research on the issue.

12
13

Levi and O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Pg. 14.
Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Pgs. 181-182.
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Finally, the last point of comparison and contrast should be the overall
goals of the writers in their books, which stems from their political orientation,
and all three of these vary significantly. Cirincione is very clear about what he
feels the goal of his work is: To bring about the elimination of nuclear arms
altogether. His work is focused almost exclusively on determining what measures
need to be brought about from the human standpoint in order to make that a
reality. However, this goal is both overly ambitious and idealistic, and I feel that
could have some effect on the credibility of his policy suggestions, although I feel
that his methods of analysis remain sound. The complete opposite approach is
taken in Levi and O’Hanlon’s book. They take a much more realist approach in
defining their goal, which is restricting access to nuclear arms for those states that
do not have them and bringing about significant arms reductions for those states
that do. Many would likely find this to be a more pragmatic and reasonable goal,
at least for the near future. Furthermore, adequately addressing the issue
American nuclear exceptionalism further adds credibility to their work. As for
Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, it is more difficult to assess an overall goal for
their work, given the multi-tiered nature of the book. Overall, I surmise that they
seek to offer an expose on several at-risk states, with a degree of general policy
suggestions for each one. Furthermore, discussion of the failings of previous nonproliferation regimes suggests that they seek to demonstrate these faults while
allowing those in power to formulate new approaches on their own. However, it
is difficult to determine whether or not they feel a nuclear-free world is possible,
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or if they share in the more realist viewpoint. As it stands, it can only be said that
all wish to stabilize the nuclear proliferation situation before the chance to do so is
gone.
In relation to this writing, these pieces provide the units for analysis that
are central to determining the central driving forces behind nuclear proliferators.
The drivers listed by Cirincione are critical to this, as they provide an established
set of probable motives to compare to in both historical and current cases. The
cases studies used by Campbell et al provide an effective framework applying
these drivers and barriers in the real world, by demonstrating how they apply to
the actors in a given situation and how they affect the outcome within a country.
Finally, Levi and O’Hanlon provide a strong framework for determining how to
exploit these motivations for a given country. All of these linked approaches are
necessary for determining who the principal actors involved in a nuclear
proliferation situation are, what their principle motivations and drivers are in
seeking nuclear arms, and how they can be deterred, countered, or contained.

11

Chapter III-Theoretical Review:
With all of these factors in mind, it is then possible to determine how these
works can be combined into a strong theoretical method for analyzing risk states
which can be used for case studies. These differing areas of emphasis for each
book allow for a comprehensive theoretical approach for creating effective
policies for fomenting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on a state by
state basis, particularly when taken in a specific order. Cirinicione’s book
provides the baseline for the entire inquiry, with his discussion of the drivers and
barriers for developing, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear arms analyzed
at an institutional level. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss’ case study approach then
allows these drivers and barriers to be applied comparatively at the state level,
which allows for individual states to be assessed and then compared as potential
nuclear proliferation risks. Finally, Levi and O’Hanlon’s book discusses possible
ways to formulate policy based on both the country in question and the specific
factors within that country that cause it to be considered an at-risk state. These
policy options can then be further divided into policies concerning the reduction
of existing nuclear arms and those concerning the implementation of an effective
non-proliferation regime for those countries that do not yet have them. By
combining the strong points of these different theoretical approaches, it should be
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possible to create a strong, coherent means of analyzing the level of risk a
potential nuclear state poses, then devising a policy method for reducing or
eliminating that risk factor.
This brings the paper to the primary theoretical discussion of this writing.
By examining the various nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, it is possible to
separate these initiatives into two primary categories. These are the large scale
category and the small scale (or area specific) category. The large scale approach
is most familiar, as it encompasses large, landmark initiatives such as the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These initiatives are massive, landmark pieces
of international legislation that are designed to dramatically alter the entire
international system, and often address issues that are considered to be of global
importance. As their name suggests, they are intended to be accepted and
followed by large numbers of countries as a means of putting global interests
above national interests. Their aims are often as ambitious as their scope, often
seeking to control or prohibit a form of national behavior that can cause harm to
international peace and prosperity (such as the development of nuclear arms).
One of the greatest advantages of a large scale initiative is that it can define the
international standard for a particular issue, which often helps gain further
acceptance of the initiative (as most countries do not like to be considered
outcasts). The NPT is an excellent example of this, as it has helped define the
overall global standard towards nuclear weapons (that they need to be reduced or
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eliminated), and has led to the notion that states who develop nuclear arms in
violation of the agreement are pariahs and should be dealt with as such 14.
However, these initiatives do have several disadvantages as well. First
and foremost, no such initiative has ever been totally and completely ratified by
every country in the world. Even the most broadly successful initiatives, such as
the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) have small numbers of holdouts who refuse to sign
the treaties. 15 Most of these countries do not sign because they believe that
following the provisions of the treaty will gravely compromise their national
security. Unfortunately, most of these security concerns are theoretically well
founded (at least in regards to the NPT and the nuclear issue). The prime
examples are India, Pakistan, and Israel. Israel’s past experiences with its
neighbors (to say nothing of the current proliferation issues with Iran) have
dictated that the country refrain from signing the NPT, even though it has not
openly declared that it is a nuclear power. The India and Pakistan issue is also
widely known, as neither will sign the NPT unless the other does. Additionally,
unless there is an overwhelming outpouring of support for a particular issue, a
14

“2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.,” May 2005, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/background.html
(accessed November, 2009).
15
“2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.,” United Nations.
“Convention on the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.” U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2001,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/bwc1.html (accessed November, 2009).
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention),” Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2008, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/
(accessed November, 2009).
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large scale initiative will often take a considerable amount of time to gain enough
signatories to be effective. For instance, the Ottawa Convention on Landmines
has taken more than ten years to gather the 156 countries that have currently
signed or acceded to it, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been open
for signature since May 2008, and only received the thirty ratifications it needs to
enter into force in February 2010 (the treaty will not actually enter into force until
August 2010). 16 Therefore, unless there is a pressing need for such drastic global
measures, such initiatives can take years or even decades to become significant
and effective in the global community.
Furthermore, another issue with many large scale initiatives is that there is
a lack of a solid disincentive for not signing the treaty or withdrawing from the
treaty. This is a glaring weakness in the NPT, the CWC, and the BWC, and this
was demonstrated when North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. While
North Korea has had sanctions imposed upon it by the UN, the NPT text itself
provides no recourse in the event a country withdraws from or violates the treaty.
Lack of a formal “stick”, so to speak, could render the initiative ineffective.
North Korea proceeding to detonate a nuclear device after withdrawing from the
treaty without incurring any sort of censure beyond economic sanctions does not,
in my opinion, set a good precedent for other countries that may be interested in

16

“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction.”, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, February
2010, http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Treaty-Text-in-Many-Languages/English
(accessed March 2010).
“Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Convention on Cluster Munitions, February 2010,
http://www.clusterconvention.org/index.php (accessed March 2, 2010).
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acquiring nuclear arms. If other countries such as Iran choose to follow suit, the
entire NPT regime could easily be in jeopardy.
My main focus will be on the small scale/area style of nuclear arms
reductions. The small scale/area specific type of initiative is the opposite
approach from a global initiative, as these initiatives are designed to influence the
behavior of a specific country. In the context of nuclear non-proliferation, these
are typically subdivided into two categories. The first is preventative, which is
designed to restrict a country’s ability to develop nuclear arms and to demonstrate
to the country in question the downsides of developing nuclear capability and
alienating the international community. The second is corrective, which is
designed to persuade a country that has developed nuclear arms to give them up.
Military and non-military variations of both exist, and both preventive and
corrective forms of these initiatives have been implemented. The isolation of
South Africa and the economic sanction put in place on North Korea are good
examples of this sort of initiative.
As its stands, the vast majority of modern nation states have already
chosen whether or not to abide by the terms of the NPT, and further global
initiatives on the issue will accomplish little to forestall those states who do want
to acquire nuclear arsenals. This is why the area-specific methods of preventing
the acquisition of nuclear arms or reducing existing arsenals are important. This
allows for a tailored approach that addresses the specific actors and conditions of
a given country. This allows for a specific set of policies to be implemented to

16

either reduce that country’s risk for developing nuclear arms or containing and
isolating it after it has developed nuclear arms. The entire Cold War era arms
control regime could be considered an area specific form of counter-proliferation,
as nearly all of the treaties and initiatives that were discussed and/or negotiated
were designed specifically to reduce arsenals of nuclear arms between NATO and
the Soviet Union (with notable exceptions being the NPT, BWC, and CWC). In
terms of nuclear weapons, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) began
the elimination of many of the nuclear weapons in the United States and Soviet
Union. 17 More modern area specific initiatives include the six-party talks with
North Korea over their nuclear program, the economic sanctions levied against
Iran and North Korea in response to building up their programs, the years of
sanctions and inspections that successfully prevented Iraq from developing
nuclear arms (which was discovered to be the case following Operation Iraqi
Freedom), and the lifting of sanctions against Libya when they publically
dismantled their WMD programs. These examples help demonstrate that areaspecific initiatives can vary significantly depending on the actors in question. The
Libyan example demonstrates an example of successful diplomacy in a nonproliferation initiative, through years of careful negotiations among the actors to
reach a specific solution for both Tripoli and Washington.

17

Amy F. Woolf, “91139: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START Iand II): Verification and
Compliance Issues.,” Congressional Research Service, November 22, 1996,
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/91-139.htm (accessed December, 2009).
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This study intends to take the area-specific study and examine each of the
national and international institutions actors involved in a specific area of interest.
The goal is to determine the most common motivators for a state to pursue nuclear
weapons, and the best means to do this is to examine both the national and
international actors involved in a given scenario. Once the interactions of the
various national and international actors in a situation is examined, it is possible
to derive their motivations and interests in seeking nuclear arms as a means of
gaining leverage over the other actors. Determining their motives then allows for
the formulation of a direct policy option that can be carried out to reduce the risk
posed by the state threatening to become a proliferator. This idea derives its roots
from the work of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, a renowned statistician and social
scientist. Bueno De Mesquita’s work involves the use of game theory to
determine the outcomes of a wide variety of international situations. 18 The core
of Bueno de Mesquita’s work is game theory, which is a derivative of rational
choice theory, and specializes in performing predictive analyses. Using a
computer model, Bueno de Mesquita generates a numerical value that correlates
to particular outcome for a particular event and/or actor. He prides himself on his
model’s ability to generate precise outcomes rather than vague predictions that
mean little. Moreover, he claims that his isolation of specific events and actors
allows for the modification of the models outcome, as the model can demonstrate

18

Clive Thompson, “Can Game Theory Predict When Iran Will Get the Bomb?” New York Times,
August 12, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16Brucet.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Bueno%20de%20Mesquita&st=cse (accessed September, 2009).
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what effects different interactions will have. Bueno de Mesquita claims that his
models have accuracy greater than 90%, and in many cases has made more
accurate predictions than analysts at the government intelligence agencies on a
given issue. He is a strong proponent of use of this system in more decision
making, both for governments and corporations, and feels that the science of
human decision making would be greatly enhanced by adopting his model and the
theory behind it. 19
However, Bueno de Mesquita’s model is not ideal for this study for a
number of reasons. First of all, access to the model is proprietary to Bueno de
Mesquita and access to it is unlikely. Additionally, Bueno de Mesquita’s main
premise (and the main premise of rational choice theory as a whole) that human
actors are entirely predictable and will always make actions based upon self
interest and rational decision making without regard to personal principles and
societal norms has been hotly debated and repeatedly questioned. More
specifically, his use of computer models to predict human decision making are
also controversial, in spite of their success rate. 20 Finally, it is always difficult to
quantify the positions of various actors through numerical values on an issue
without such figures being entirely arbitrary.
However, what Bueno de Mesquita’s analysis does prove is that a micro
level analysis of actors and institutions is an effective means of determining the
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specific risks that are characteristic of nuclear proliferation states, and it shows
how predictions can be influenced. My proposal is to break an at-risk state into
the most prominent actors both inside and outside the target state, and analyze
their positions on the nuclear issue in regards to the various drivers and barriers
for nuclear development. By taking this micro-level approach tailoring
international policy towards risk states based on the individual conditions
prevailing in each state, it allows for the implementation of nonproliferation
policies that address the opinions and interests of the unique actors in each state.
This is the primary goal of this study: To take the institutions and actors (both
national and international) that are the main influences in an at-risk state,
determine the characteristics associated with each actor and institution, and
compare these characteristics between the actors to determine how that risk state
might be dissuaded, interdicted, or even forcibly prevented from gaining nuclear
arms. Each actor will be analyzed using the five drivers and barriers presented in
Cirincione’s work. These individual analyses will then be combined to try and
determine what the most compelling drivers for nuclear proliferation are, and
what policy options are the best to contain proliferators.
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Chapter IV-Historical Review:
Before discussing an ongoing case such as Iran, it is necessary to discuss
this study’s theory in the context of several historical cases, both of the successes
and the failures of the existing non-proliferation regime. These examples are
designed to demonstrate how the various actors involved in each of these
situations interacted, and how their actions resulted in either a positive outcome or
a negative outcome. These historical cases have been selected to provide a solid
historical comparison to Iran’s case after conducting the primary case study.
They have also been selected to demonstrate which drivers are the most
compelling for a state that is developing nuclear weapons, and which barriers are
the most effective at deterring a state from developing nuclear arms (or getting
them to reverse their decision to produce nuclear arms if they have already
started). They are highly diverse, spanning multiple regions and multiple
cultures, and are designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of an analysis using
the actors and the five drivers/barriers without running afoul of issues such as
cultural or political biases that could be derived from studying risk states in a
single region. They have also been selected due to their highly public nature, and
a great deal of information is available about all of these cases, which makes the
analysis of their actors and drivers both simpler and more effective.
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Overview of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Before discussing the successes and failures of the nonproliferation
regime, it is first important to discuss the foundations of this regime: the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Currently only three countries in the world (India,
Pakistan, and Israel) have never signed the treaty, making it one of the most
widely signed international treaties in history. Of the countries that have signed
the NPT, only North Korea has ever withdrawn from it. This treaty has defined
the global attitudes towards nuclear weapons and nuclear energy since its
inceptions, and those countries that have not complied with it have often been
ostracized by the international community. Its influence cannot be understated,
but many believe that its future may be in doubt.
The concept for the treaty began shortly after the end of World War II,
when it became apparent that the pursuit of nuclear energy and technology would
put the world at risk for nuclear arms proliferation. However, principal
negotiations on the treaty did not begin until 1957, and the negotiations picked up
quickly during the 1960s. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is not listed as a
motivator for the treaty, but the timing would suggest that the nuclear war scare
caused most countries to examine the potential risks of having a nuclear arsenal.
The treaty was put into effect in 1968, and it was decided that it would be put up
for review every twenty-five years. At the first review conference in 1995, it was
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decided that the treaty would be extended indefinitely, and that reviews would be
held every five years afterward. 21
The treaty is divided into eleven articles. Article I directs any member
state not to transfer nuclear arms or control of nuclear arms to any non-nuclear
weapon states, and not to encourage any non-nuclear weapons state to construct
nuclear arms. Article II directs any state party to the treaty not to accept the
transfer of nuclear arms or accept assistance in developing nuclear arms, and not
seek the purchase or manufacture of nuclear arms through any means. Article III
establishes the International Atomic Energy Agency as the primary nuclear
safeguards authority, and states the means by which states party to the treaty
conclude agreements with the IAEA. Article IV establishes each state’s right to
peaceful nuclear energy, and the right to render assistance to any other country
party to the treaty in the development of peaceful nuclear energy. Article V
discusses the usage of “peaceful nuclear explosives” and that their potential
applications and use should be monitored and overviewed by the other states party
to the treaty. Article VI calls for the existing nuclear weapon states to begin
negotiations to bring an early end to the nuclear arms race, and to seek the
disarmament of their nuclear arsenals. Article VII establishes each signatory
state’s right to form regional treaties to establish the total absence of nuclear arms
in those regions. Article VIII establishes the procedures for proposing and voting
on amendments to the articles of the treaty. Article IX establishes the procedures
21
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for signing and ratifying the treaty. Article X provides the procedures for
withdrawing from the treaty, and states have the right to withdraw from the treaty
if extraordinary events jeopardize their supreme interests. It has to give notice to
the U.N. Security Council and all other parties to the treaty of its withdrawal three
months in advance. Article X also establishes that reviews of the treaty should be
held every twenty-five years, although this has since been amended to a review
every five years. Article XI establishes the archival procedures for the treaty. 22
The treaty’s mandate is to provide all of the member states with the means
to pursue nuclear energy, while prohibiting the production of nuclear arms and
eliminating existing arsenals. This treaty is also attributed with setting the global
attitude towards nuclear arms, and beginning the series of nuclear disarmament
talks between the United States and Soviet Union during the later years of the
Cold War. 23 However, there have been significant problems with the treaty. First
among these was India’s refusal to sign the treaty when it was first put into force,
claiming that the treaty was discriminatory. 24 North Korea’s withdrawal from the
NPT has further compromised the treaty’s integrity. Many question whether the
treaty will endure over the coming years. Both the upcoming 2010 Review
Conference and Iran’s behavior will likely determine the outcome of the NPT
regime.
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Successes of the Non-Proliferation Regime:
South Africa
South Africa is quite possibly the best example of a country choosing of
its own accord to accede to the NPT regime. In 1993, South African President de
Klerk publicly revealed the South African nuclear program. In addition to
disclosing the program, de Klerk also announced the deactivation of both the
program and the six warheads it had produced. 25 In addition, all South African
nuclear facilities were made available for IAEA inspection and the entire program
was verified as disabled prior to South Africa signing the NPT. South Africa’s
unilateral dismantlement of its nuclear program is a unique event in global
politics, and is the only time a country has willingly revoked its nuclear arms after
having developed them, and is truly the best example of the success of the NPT.
The actors and institutions involved in the South African nuclear program
evolved and changed considerably over the course of the program, illustrating the
need for determining the important actors in present-day nuclear risk states.
During the early phases of the program under the Atomic Energy Board (AEB),
the South African nuclear program qualified under the Peaceful Nuclear
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Explosives (PNE) program, and was actually being examined for use in mining. 26
However, South Africa’s deteriorating security environment led to major changes
in the South African defense establishment. This followed strong negative
reactions from the United States and Soviet Union to the nuclear program as well.
These changes included the reorganization of the AEB into the Atomic Energy
Corporation (AEC), which was tasked with the production of atomic weapons. 27
This was further exacerbated by the Arms Corporation of South Africa (Armscor),
which was the chief arms manufacturer in South Africa and a strong proponent of
nuclear weapons as a deterrent force for the South Africa. 28 Also notable was
change in government leadership. President de Klerk, in spite of being reputed as
a “hawk”, quickly took steps to disarm South Africa’s nuclear program, which
was a significant change in policy from his predecessors. In the face of
potentially serious opposition from the military, he went ahead with the
immediate elimination of South Africa’s nuclear capability. 29 Additionally,
international actors had a very strong influence on the outcome in South Africa.
The U.N.’s economic sanctions (resulting from the South African nuclear
program) were one of the principal means of getting South Africa to disarm, and
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the IAEA was responsible for both the inspections and reporting the openness that
the South Africans displayed in dismantling their nuclear program.
The drivers for South Africa’s nuclear problem evolved over time based
on the changing geopolitics. Initially, the program was seen more as a means to
demonstrate South Africa’s technological capability to build the bomb, in addition
to the prestige that came with becoming a nuclear state, particularly during the
U.S. Atoms for Peace and Peaceful Nuclear Explosives programs. 30 Economics
also drove the South African decision to pursue the nuclear program, as the AEC
stood to benefit from being able to provide both nuclear power and various forms
of enriched uranium to various customers. However, external security quickly
trumped all other concerns for South Africa’s nuclear program as the 1960s
progressed. Following the signing of the NPT, greater pressure was applied to
South Africa from the United States. The country’s non-compliance with the
NPT and practice of apartheid eventually led to total isolation from most of the
global community. Furthermore, ongoing clashes with a Soviet and Cuban
supported Angolan army in Namibia further worried the South African
government. This in turn led to the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, fed
by uranium mined domestically, an underground test shaft in the Kalahari Desert,
the test detonation that occurred in the Indian Ocean in 1979, and eventually the
six gun barrel-type nuclear weapons created. 31
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If South Africa went to all the trouble to defy the international community
and develop an indigenous nuclear program, then what factors could persuade the
country to radically reverse its policy and completely dismantle its program?
Details are unclear, but interestingly enough, security again appears to be the
primary factor in South Africa choosing to dismantle its nuclear program. The
elimination of South Africa’s regional threats resulted in a drastic shift in opinion
of South African foreign policy makers, and it was quickly decided that
elimination of their weapons was in South Africa’s security interests. The
conflicts with Angola in Namibia reached their peak in 1988, with tens of
thousands of troops on both sides poised to fight at the South African border. The
military stalemate opened the way for negotiations between the parties, eventually
resulting in a ceasefire. 32 The breakup of the Soviet Union also removed South
Africa’s other major security concern, since there would no longer be Soviet units
and advisors in Africa spreading the influence of the Warsaw Pact. Domestic
politics and prestige also played a part in the dismantlement. President de Klerk
made dismantlement of the program and ending apartheid immediate priorities
upon his election, and elimination of the nuclear warheads prevented their misuse
by extremist elements in the country who did not agree with his agenda. 33
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Today, South Africa is a major proponent of nuclear disarmament and a
strong supporter of the NPT. The country has remained free of nuclear arms and
weapons grade uranium since acceding to the NPT. That being said, there are still
the potential for serious issues with the South African nuclear program. The
country retains its entire nuclear industry and fuel cycle, and could easily resume
production of weapons grade uranium if the need arises. Now, this would involve
leaving the NPT, but as long as the country cites “supreme circumstances” or at
least gives 90 days notice, any country can withdraw from the treaty without any
penalty in the context of the NPT. 34 As a practical matter, there would likely be
an enormous diplomatic backlash, the results of which are impossible to predict
(given that North Korea was entirely isolated for its program, but India and
Pakistan were not). Regardless of the outcome, South Africa could still redevelop
its weapons at very short notice if there was a drastic change in South African
foreign policy.

Libya
One of the most surprising cases of a country choosing disarmament is
that of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya. Under Qaddafi’s leadership, Libya had
gained a reputation as a rogue, isolationist state throughout the Cold War era, due
to its support of terrorism (including the Lockerbie bombing in 1988) 35, repeated
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military skirmishes with the United States, and most importantly, its ongoing
efforts to produce nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as procuring the
ballistic launchers from North Korea to deliver them. 36 In December 2003,
however, Qaddafi stunned the world by announcing his intent to unilaterally end
Libya’s WMD programs, following months of secret negotiations with the United
States. While Libya never developed a working nuclear weapon, it did have an
active chemical weapons program as well as several ballistic launchers, and has
since eliminated or turned all of these over to the United States (it does retain a
small ballistic missile capability). 37
Unlike South Africa, Libya’s case appears to be more homogenous at the
state level. There is very little information available about the command structure
of the Libyan WMD programs, so it is difficult to determine the positions of the
Libyan institutions on the nuclear issue. This is unsurprising, given the extremely
centralized and somewhat paranoid nature of the Libyan government, which is
built entirely around the leadership of Muammar al-Qaddafi. 38 His repeated
suppression of dissent and of any group that seeks to undermine his regime
(including Fundamentalist Muslims, private businesses, and even his own
military) is in line with the popular image of Libya as a state built around one
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man’s cult of personality. 39 Given the evident lack of institutional differences in
the Libyan government (at least on the nuclear issue), the principle institutions
and actors in this scenario have been at the international level. These included the
Libyan government, the United States government, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and the United Nations. The actors and policies of the U.S.
government in particular played a key role in giving Libya the opportunity to
renounce its weapons of mass destruction. When Libya made clear its intention to
come to the negotiating table, the Bush Administration’s neo-conservatives were
left out of the loop, allowing the administration to take a more moderate approach
than when dealing with states such as Iran and Syria. 40 This meant that the U.S.
was willing to make concessions to the Libyans in exchange for disarming (as
opposed to the Bush Administration’s demands that Syria and Iran unilaterally
renounce nuclear weapons), and is arguably what allowed Libya to go ahead with
its disarmament plan.
The drivers for Libya’s WMD programs were not all that dissimilar from
South Africa’s. The primary driver again appears to be security; although
Qaddafi’s often contradictory statements on the issue make a definitive
conclusion difficult to come by. However, Israel appears to be the main security
concern for the Libyans at the time, as Qaddafi made repeated statements
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expressing his concern about Israel’s nuclear arsenal. 41 It’s also probable that
there were security concerns with Chad, which Libya had several border clashes
with, and it had even used some of its chemical weapons against Chad during the
1980s. 42 Libya had also shown interest in purchasing technology for nuclear
power stations from the Soviets and Belgians as well. 43 However, there is no
other evidence that economics was a significant driver in the development of the
Libyan nuclear program. Prestige and domestic politics are also a possibility, but
no corroborating evidence exists.
By contrast, Libya had a number of barriers in a number of categories to
the development of its nuclear program, which ultimately led to the abandonment
of its program. Although economics had little to do with Libya’s development of
the bomb, they had a great deal to do with why they abandoned the program.
There are indications going back as far as the end of the Clinton administration
that Libya was becoming interested in trading its WMD programs for an end to
sanctions against the country, which were having a marked effect on the Libyan
economy by dramatically reducing Libyan oil exports. 44 Furthermore, Libya had
to buy most of its outside expertise, which would further increase the effect of
sanctions on slowing the program. 45 Security seems to be the second most
significant factor in the Libyan decision to abandon WMDs, and there are two
notable events that stand out. The first of these was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
41
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March 2003, which many argue provided a strong example of the U.S. response to
rogue states thought to be developing weapons of mass destruction. 46 The second
was the October 2003 seizure of a German cargo ship by the U.S. Navy in the
Mediterranean Sea. 47 The ship was loaded with uranium enrichment components,
including parts for hundreds of centrifuges, and was bound for Tripoli. It has not
been revealed what the source of the parts was, but it seems likely that Qaddafi
did not want to risk a U.S. military response to the seizure, and decided to cut his
losses. Prestige also seems a notable factor, as Qaddafi has gained a great deal of
international praise for abandoning his program (again, much like South Africa),
and it seems likely that Qaddafi knew that what sort of positive treatment he
would receive from the international community. 48
Interestingly, Libya is probably an even lower risk for nuclear
rearmament than South Africa is today. Given Libya’s complete lack of nuclear
industry, the country would have no means to produce a weapon if there was a
radical change in Libyan politics. Furthermore, the amount of time and
diplomatic energy Libya has spent normalizing relations with the United States by
eliminating its arsenal would militate against Libya reversing its decision to
eliminate its WMD. The level of transparency Libya has allowed regarding the
inspection of its former WMD facilities and its ballistic weapons reinforces
further suggests that Libya is more interested in returning to the mainstream in
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international politics than keeping nuclear arms. Barring an extreme reversal of
policy (or an involuntary change of government), it would seem that Libya is
unlikely to reverse its WMD policy as long as it continues to reap the benefits of
abandoning its program.

Successful Disarmament Treaties: START and INF
An international agreement can also be examined in the context of the
principal actors involved, and there are also a number of interesting characteristics
that can be examined to see what makes for an effective nuclear arms control
treaty. Arguably the most effective of these treaties are the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).
Both of these treaties resulted in drastic reductions in both the Soviet and
American nuclear arsenals, and remain historic in their scope, the length of time
required to negotiate them, and lasting effects they have had on strategic policy of
the United States and Russia in the years since their signing and ratification.
The INF treaty has been one of the most far reaching arms control
agreements ever reached. While its scope is fairly narrow, it is the only arms
control treaty to ever eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms for the
participants. 49 As the name suggests, these were Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles (IRBMs) and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs). The idea for
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the treaty began following the deployment of the Russian SS-20 advanced IRBM
in the European theater. As NATO and the USSR began deploying more
intermediate and shorter range weapons in the area (of more advanced design),
both sides began to come forward with offers of reducing INF in both countries,
and eventually eliminating them. President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev
signed the agreement in September of 1987, and immediately entered into force.
One of the other defining characteristics of the treaty was its extremely thorough
in its verification techniques to ensure both sides dismantled their INF weapons. 50
The highly intrusive means of verification provided by the treaty is one of
the reasons for its success. These included not only remote inspection by satellite,
but also on site inspections of relevant nuclear facilities. 51 While the START
treaty also covers such inspections, INF has the most invasive inspection regime,
and strongly encourages compliance. Furthermore, it remains in full effect today.
The treaty’s primary driver seems to be, strangely enough, security. Both sides
feared the build up of arms in the region enough to come to the table. To be
entirely fair, the U.S. hedged its bets with the development of its Pershing I and II
IRBMs and nuclear tipped GLCMs in Europe, but was equally interested in the
disarmament talks. 52

50

“Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” U.S. Department of State.
51
“Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” U.S. Department of State.
52
“Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,” U.S. Department of State.

35

Unlike the INF treaty, the START I treaty has a much broader scope, and
while it hasn’t achieved the feat INF has in eliminating all weapons covered under
its purview, it has still been a dramatic success. 53 It reduced all strategic nuclear
warheads on each side to 6,000, with 1,600 strategic delivery systems. These
delivery systems included Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. 54 The treaty was
signed in 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, the
treaty was successfully multilateralized after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and
all of the successor states complied with the terms (including the total
disarmament of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). 55 While it is unclear exactly
how close Russia and the United States came to meeting START I’s guidelines,
arsenals were significantly reduced, and as of 1996, both sides were ahead of their
timetables on the elimination of their armaments. 56 Furthermore, the treaty has
proven so successful that both the United States and Russia chose to continue
abiding by its terms even after its expiration in December 2009. 57 In April 2010,
Russia and the United States signed the treaty’s replacement, referred to as New
START. This treaty is reported to reduce nuclear arms to their lowest levels ever,
almost a quarter of their Cold War highs. It also nullifies the largely ineffective
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SORT treaty. The long term effects of this treaty remain to be seen, but they
could lead to a new era of nuclear cooperation between the two states. 58
While the drivers of the START treaty are not clear, it can be inferred that
they are similar to those of INF, since the treaties were negotiated simultaneously.
This suggests that both sides began to regard their nuclear arsenals as a security
liability rather than an asset. This is further evidenced by the complete
elimination of the nuclear arsenals in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
However, there are some barriers to certain parts of its implementation. Since the
treaty covers strategic weapons (which require significant and expensive
infrastructure to deploy and maintain), some of the Soviet successor states have
had issues complying with some of the more stringent facility elimination
requirements. In spite of its various issues, it remains a very successful treaty and
the gold standard for arms control treaties.
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Failures of the Nonproliferation Regime:
North Korea
Arguably the greatest failure of the NPT has been its inability to
effectively prevent North Korea’s efforts produce nuclear arms. North Korea is
the only case of a country withdrawing from the NPT after signing it, and it then
proceeded to make an indigenous nuclear program (culminating in an attempted
test detonation) in total defiance of the international community. Furthermore,
there has been a complete lack of strong international response to the program
during the Clinton and second Bush administrations. This incident illustrates the
lack of serious international response and the inability of the NPT to provide
disincentives for states that ignore the treaty.
Once again, the principal actors in this situation are international actors,
given the highly monolithic North Korean government, which is widely known
for basing itself entirely around the personality of its leader. Thus, the principle
actors have been the United States, North Korea, Russia, China, the UN, the
IAEA, South Korea, and Japan. The positions of these actors have dictated the
evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, with South Korea and Japan in the
most threatened position by a belligerent, nuclear armed North Korea, while the
United States, Russia, and China are forced to play the peacekeepers, all of whom
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have different angles on the crisis. However, this is changing. During the most
recent nuclear tests in mid-2009, Russia and China joined the American
condemnation of the program, and China (historically the strongest supporter of
the DPRK on the UN Security Council) has recently taken steps such as allowing
the seizure of North Korean funds in Macao. 59 Furthermore, there may be
additional complications in analyzing the North Korean state, as it may not be
possible to treat it as a monolithic entity for much longer. Following Kim JongIl’s stroke in 2008, reports indicate that a succession struggle has begun in North
Korea, in the event that his health continues to decline. 60 While it is unclear who
may be vying for leadership after Kim Jong-Il or who their supporters might be, it
will certainly become complicated as more actors become relevant in an
impoverished, isolated, nuclear armed country with a history of aggression.
North Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons dates back to the 1950s, but it
was not until the 1990s that North Korea’s nuclear program became a serious
concern. 61 North Korea first signaled its intent to leave the NPT in 1994, and
began constructing its nuclear reactors and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon.
The main source of weapons grade material for the DPRK is the reprocessing of
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spent nuclear fuel rods into plutonium, and it appears to have received technical
aid from Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan network in the late 1990s. 62 The other
major concern is the North Korean ballistic missile inventory, which features an
extremely large stockpile of ballistic missiles that can be fitted with nuclear
warheads. These include Soviet designed Scud-Bs and –Cs, as well as
indigenously designed Nodong and Taepodong missiles. 63 However, there is still
no concrete information on what nuclear warheads may be in the North Korean
arsenal, and to what degree they have been weaponized. It should also be noted
that the principle concern with the North Korean program is not as much a direct
nuclear assault by the DPRK (which would likely result in a devastating nuclear
response from the United States) but rather that the DPRK would sell its nuclear
weapons or nuclear material in exchange for much needed hard currency. 64
Nearly all sources agree that the drivers for North Korea’s nuclear
program are security and economics. Security appears to be the more prominent
driver of the two in the North Korean case. North Korea first characterized its
“nuclear deterrent force” as a policy bargaining chip in 2003, and has repeatedly
claimed that it was developing nuclear arms to for self defense and to defy U.S.
sanctions and nuclear threats. 65 Perversely, Kim Jong-Il seems intent on using the
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nuclear program as a means of forcing the United States reengage with North
Korea, and trying to pull a non-aggression agreement out of the U.S.
Unfortunately, the situation is getting worse as North Korea’s language has
become more belligerent in recent times, as a result of growing Russian and
Chinese irritation with the lack of predictability of the DPRK and its continued
defiance of the international community. 66 Economics have also been a driver for
North Korea’s nuclear program, but not in the conventional sense (i.e. being able
to produce nuclear energy for sale). Instead, North Korea has been more
interested in using the program as a bargaining chip to have U.N. sanctions lifted
and gain economic cooperation with Japan and South Korea. 67 However, as
relations have progressively worsened, especially in 2009, the security argument
appears to be taking a greater priority for the North Korean government. The
nuclear and ballistic weapons are used to provide “scientific nationalism” to the
people of North Korea, as evidence of Korean military might and scientific
progress. This complements a tremendous amount of propaganda proclaiming the
necessity of the military above all else, which discourages dissent and keeps the
Korean populace focused on external threats instead of their own problems. 68 If

66

Michishita, “The 13 February Action Plan and the Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear
Issue,” Pg. 7.
67
Michishita, “The 13 February Action Plan and the Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear
Issue,” Pg. 9.
68
“North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs,” International Crisis Group, June 18, 2009, pgs.
5,14-15,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/north_korea/168_north_koreas_nuclear_and_m
issile_programs.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).

41

the regime feels its domestic legitimacy is threatened and public discontent is a
possibility, it will be less likely to give up its nuclear arms.
As for barriers, economics and technology appear to be the main inhibiting
factors for the North Korean nuclear program. In terms of nuclear technology,
North Korea’s nuclear facilities are lacking in sophistication and many of them
are outdated. Furthermore, most of their major nuclear facilities are unfinished
and years away from completion, which significantly limits their ability to
produce weapons and fissile material. 69 Furthermore, it is also estimated that
their ability to produce highly enriched uranium weapons is less advanced than
their plutonium production capabilities. 70 In terms of economics, the continuing
sanctions severely limit North Korea’s ability to purchase the equipment for their
nuclear industry, and this will be particularly true if the United States decides to
enforce its legal authority to inspect North Korean ships at sea. 71 However, these
barriers are still relatively minor, as they only prevent large scale production of
atomic devices. It is still believed that they already have several devices in their
arsenal, with the capability to build more. 72
North Korea presents an extreme risk not just to its regional neighbors, but
also to the NPT regime as a whole. It has set the unsettling precedent that the
NPT can be withdrawn from at will with no recourse except sanctions, and may
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well serve to encourage countries such as Iran to proceed with development of
their own nuclear arsenals. North Korea’s potential to become a nuclear
marketplace presents an even greater hazard, which could allow for the
acquisition of nuclear arms by other countries or even terrorist groups. With all
of this in mind, North Korea could be a disaster of tremendous proportions for the
future of nonproliferation, depending on how this emerging nuclear power is
managed over the coming years.

India and Pakistan
The nuclear standoff on the Indian sub-continent has been its own Cold
War since both countries declared their nuclear arms capability in the late 1990s.
This situation could easily be considered as much of a nonproliferation disaster as
North Korea, but for a few different reasons. Neither country signed the NPT,
since India claimed it was discriminatory and Pakistan would not sign if India did
not sign it first. It also highlights the lack of commitment the existing nuclear
states have towards disarming their own nuclear arsenals, and the dismissal of the
issue in the face of other political issues (such as the War on Terror).
Additionally, the internal problems in Pakistan present an opportunity for
terrorists and other non-state actors to steal or outright buy nuclear arms. As a
result, many analysts view the entire region as a primed nuclear powder keg.
Given how closely interrelated these two countries’ nuclear weapon programs are,
these states will be reviewed together.
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Clearly, the two primary actors are India and Pakistan in this particular
case. However, unlike North Korea, these are not monolithic countries centered
on the ideology of one leader. India’s case in particular is rife with actors with
different positions and views on the nuclear issue, and the evolution of the issue
has changed with the actors involved. 73 Pakistan’s drive for a nuclear weapon
was more widely agreed upon by the Pakistani’s (as they felt their own survival
was threatened by Indian nuclear arms), but there were specific actors in the
country that were responsible for the development of its nuclear arms. Dr. Abdul
Qadeer Khan is one of the most notable of these, as he spearheaded the Pakistani
nuclear weapons program from the scientific side. 74 The major international
actors in this particular case were the United States and the United Nations, given
the lack of involvement of the IAEA. The United States in particular had a great
deal of responsibility for its lack of any effective response to the growing nuclear
issue during the Clinton and second Bush administrations. Sanctions on both
sides were light (and most of those were later lifted), which did little to impede
the development of nuclear arms on either side. 75
The nuclear developments of both sides date back to the signing of the
NPT in 1968, with India as the catalyst. India declined to sign the NPT because it
felt the treaty was discriminatory and allowed the existing nuclear weapon states a
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monopoly 76. India tested its first “peaceful nuclear explosive” in 1974, but it is
not attributed as having deliverable nuclear arms until 1986-88. 77 However, the
series of 5 nuclear test detonations from May 11th 1998 to May 13th of the same
year are what made the situation critical. By that time, India had developed
several ballistic missile types easily capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and
has been a full nuclear weapon state since. 78 However, Pakistan was ready for it,
as it had been developing its own nuclear program since the 1970s, in response to
India’s refusal to sign the NPT. Initially, it had planned a nuclear test in 1977 in
response to the Indian 1974 test, but that was cancelled. It conducted its first
“cold test” in 1983, and in 1988, Pakistan had several nuclear weapons
constructed, but left disassembled. 79 In 1998, Pakistan immediately picked up
India’s thrown gauntlet and test-detonated at least two (possibly as many of six)
nuclear weapons between May 28th and 30th, which put a stop to Indian talks of
military action in Kashmir. 80
The drivers vary on both sides of the conflict. In the Indian case, the
typical driver for nuclear arms, security, is questionable. In many cases, it is
believed that India does not have any major security threats that would merit a
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nuclear arsenal, including China. 81 However, the Indians themselves claimed that
it was motivated by security issues (namely the Pakistani nuclear program). 82
Interestingly enough, prestige appears to India’s lead driver in the initial
development of its nuclear arms. India’s belief that the NPT was discriminatory
indicates that it felt that as long as nuclear weapons were a staple of the other
great powers of the world, it could not be denied the same right. 83 Another major
driver appears to be technological, as it appears that the Indian scientific
community was strongly in favor of creating nuclear arms. Former Indian Prime
Minister H.D. Deve Gowda was quoted as saying “the scientists had approached
previous two governments to continue the tests, once in 1995 and in 1997.
Gowda claimed that he had told them to wait, but the persistence of the Indian
scientific community appears to have eventually led to the test. 84 The Indians
also claimed that scientific research was another reason for the 1998 nuclear
tests. 85 By contrast, the Pakistani nuclear program appears to be almost entirely
security oriented. There is no mention of Pakistan pursuing nuclear energy for
economic purposes or to shore up domestic political support. Developing its
nuclear program cost Pakistan prestige, and technology was one of Pakistan’s
chief barriers in the program. 86 By process of elimination, that leaves security,
and unfortunately, there is ample cause for Pakistan to be concerned with security.
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Of course, chief among these is India. Pakistan has declared its nuclear inventory
to be for first strike use, to counter India’s far stronger conventional military. 87
Clearly, Pakistan still views India as its primary threat, as its arsenal has
continued to grow along with India’s. 88
Even worse is the fact that there are very few barriers or disincentives that
apply to either nuclear program. Obviously, there are few if any foreign security
barriers to either of these country’s nuclear programs. This is particularly true in
the Pakistani case, as the American strategic partnership with Pakistan in the War
on Terror is widely known, in spite of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal. There
is little or no indication that either country’s economy is under strain due to their
ongoing nuclear programs. Technology does not seem to be an issue either, since
both countries have fully fledged nuclear programs and have built (India) or are in
the process of building (Pakistan) their own indigenous hydrogen bombs 89 90.
These projects are currently underway with entirely indigenous infrastructure, so
there should be few technology barriers at this point. The domestic issue is likely
to be the greatest disincentive for those countries to continue their arms
developments, especially in Pakistan. Pakistan has a continuously growing
domestic security problem with large numbers of Taliban and other Islamic
militants within their borders, and this insurgency is causing a number of
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international concerns about the security of the Pakistani arsenal 91. The arrest of
A.Q. Khan in 2004 under charges of selling nuclear secrets is one of the
penultimate examples of this. While Indian domestic security and politics do not
seem to be a major factor, it is worth remembering India has suffered a number of
terrorist attacks over the past decade (such as the Mumbai attack in 2008).
Therefore, the risk that a terrorist group might steal a nuclear weapon from India
cannot be entirely ruled out.
Overall, India and Pakistan present a variety of serious hazards to both the
nonproliferation regime and global security as a whole. These two countries with
decades of political and religious animosity have fought several conventional
wars, and with both countries continuously building up and modernizing their
nuclear forces, the potential for a cataclysmic regional conflict is present and
increasing. With India’s growing economic might and Pakistan’s strategic
importance to the U.S. and its allies, such a nuclear war would have an enormous
impact on world politics and economics. Furthermore, growing terrorism and
insurgency in both countries continues to increase the risk of nuclear weapon theft
or black market sale. Until both countries can engage each other peacefully and
agree to dismantle their nuclear arms, both countries will remain grave liabilities
to global nonproliferation.
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Conclusions
From all of these cases, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First and
foremost, nearly all of these cases demonstrate that the need for regime survival
seems to be the absolute root for the development of nuclear arms. Pakistan’s
case was a country developing nuclear arms for fear of being annihilated by its
larger, more powerful neighbor. North Korea’s is an attempt to stave off
potentially regime crippling unrest from within and prevent (perceived) threats of
American military action from abroad. South Africa developed its program to
defend against aggression from neighboring states and to stem the spread of
Soviet influence in Africa. All of these cases demonstrate these countries
developing nuclear arms to prevent their regime from crumbling due to either
internal or external threats. These fall under the national security and the
domestic politics drivers. However, when it comes to getting these types of states
to disarm, the most effective means appears to be crippling these countries
economically and demonstrating the cooperative benefits they stand to reap from
giving up their nuclear arsenals and rejoining the international community. Both
Libya and South Africa benefited tremendously from giving up their nuclear
arms, economically and diplomatically. Furthermore, both had come to the
realization that the survival of their governments was facilitated by abandoning
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their nuclear arms. Libya in particular was becoming increasingly unstable prior
to giving up its arsenal, suffering both attempted coups against Qaddafi and
severe economic sanctions, which ended after Libya gave up its nuclear arms.
These cases help determine both the likely motives for nuclear proliferators and
the likely barriers to the continuation of a nuclear weapon development program.
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Chapter V-Primary Case Study: Iran:
National Actors
Inside Iran, there are two principle actors which affect the nuclear issue,
which differ in their political orientation rather than professional affiliation or
geographic location. These are the two major factions in the Iranian political
elite, and due to the fact that the elites. The first of these are the pragmatic
conservatives. This is the more moderate faction in the Iranian political elite, and
would be willing to normalize Iranian relations with the United States and the rest
of the world. They controlled the diplomatic negotiations over the Iranian nuclear
program from 2003 to 2005, and were much less problematic for the U.N. and
IAEA to negotiate with. The pragmatists have been open to compromise, and
have also been sensitive to international opinion and pressure. This has made the
pragmatic conservatives more open to international engagement and
globalization. While they do seek to expand Iran’s power and influence on the
international stage, their willingness to compromise and negotiate would make
them more amenable to a bargain on the nuclear issue. Notable pragmatic
conservatives include former President Rafsanjani and Hassan Rowhani (the
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former lead negotiator to the U.S. and U.N. in 2004 and former secretary of the
Supreme National Security Council). 92
The second principle actor inside the Iranian political elite is the
Ideological Conservative faction. This has been the dominant faction in Iranian
politics since the 2005 election and represents thinking common to the early days
of the Revolution. This faction is characterized by militancy and paranoia, and
sees the world through a Hobbesian perspective which dictates that military might
is the only effective means of demonstrating power and influence international
politics, and that “predatory powers lurk to dictate and dominate” each other.
Unfortunately, this means that most of its members subscribe to the idea that
diplomacy is simply a means of interchange among actors in any balance of
power, but does nothing to alter the balance. Compromise on any issue is
unlikely, and these ideologues seek to “impose Iran on the international
community.” Security guarantees are seen as insulting, international opinion and
goodwill are irrelevant, and the sensitivity of the nuclear issue in Iran is seen as
evidence of Iran’s rising power and geopolitical importance. Furthermore, it
currently enjoys support from both regular and irregular military elements, as well
as the more conservative clergy. Current President Ahmadinejad and Speaker of
the Iranian Parliament Larijani are prominent examples of Ideological
Conservatives. 93
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It is important to note that these factions are not diametrically opposed,
especially on the nuclear issue. Both support a strong Iran, and both support
Iran’s indigenous nuclear program. The principle differences are in the
perspectives of the international community and ideas on how Iran should interact
with it. The pragmatists seek to normalize relations with the rest of the world,
and are open to compromise. While they view the nuclear program as important,
they are not willing to let Iran become an international pariah in the process. The
opposite is true for the ideological faction, which in fact favors a confrontation
with the western powers. This group sees a confrontation as a means to divide the
West from states like Russia and China, and that Iran’s oil revenues and
geopolitical importance give them a number of options in that scenario. If the
United States is to have any chance of resolving this issue diplomatically, it
appears more and more that it will have to try and interact with the pragmatic
elements of the Iranian elite as much as possible. If the ideologues retain the most
power, it is highly unlikely that a diplomatic solution will be viable. 94

External/International Actors
The first major international actor in the standoff with Iran is the United
States. The American position regarding the Iranian nuclear program has been
vociferous, repeatedly stating that any development of nuclear arms has been
unacceptable. Iran has also been squarely in Washington’s sights since the
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revision of its policies regarding the control of WMD proliferation. The Bush
administration shifted the American focus from controlling the technologies
involved in the production of nuclear arms to the identities of countries
involved. 95 The most obvious results of this policy were the invasion of Iraq and
the statement that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea had formed an “Axis of Evil”. It
also increased U.S. reliance on unilateral intervention in these cases, calling into
question American willingness to work with its allies abroad on the proliferation
issue. The other problem was that foreign policy makers have viewed Iranian
regional ambitions as entirely antithetical to American strategic objectives in the
Middle East. However, the overall American response has repeatedly wavered
between a hard-line policy of a totally nuclear-free Iran and occasional
willingness to negotiate. However, the inability of the Bush Administration to
turn either approach into any meaningful results has critically hampered
Washington’s ability to deal with Tehran today. This has been compounded by
the special antipathy the Bush administration reserved for Tehran, which has
translated both into a widespread social distrust of Iran by American citizens and
lack of any proposed incentives to Iran for halting its nuclear program. 96
President Obama has been taking steps to show American willingness to
negotiate, which has even started getting some Chinese willingness to discuss
measures against Iran. However, it is becoming clear that he still favors targeted
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sanctions, and it appears unlikely that he will relent on preventing or limiting
Iran’s nuclear program until it gives up its enrichment facilities. 97
The next principal actor in the growing tensions with Tehran is Israel. As
the target of Tehran’s anti-Semitic rhetoric, the only existing nuclear power in the
Middle East, and arguably the least stable element in the dispute over Iran’s
nuclear program, Israel bears special mention. Under the leadership of Benjamin
Netanyahu, Israel has adopted a hard line posture towards Iran and has repeatedly
warned of the growing threat of a nuclear Iran. Moreover, there is growing
popular support in Israel for preempting the Iranian nuclear program, regardless
of the consequences. 98 Ahmedinejad’s inflammatory anti-Israeli rhetoric has
further reinforced the notion of Iran as an existential threat to the Israelis, and the
notion of Israeli pre-emptive strikes has to be taken seriously. However, if Iran
does proceed in gaining a full nuclear production capacity, there are a huge
number of possible responses. The most important factor is whether or not Iran
chooses to stay with the capacity to build nuclear arms or actually develops a
nuclear weapon. If the latter case occurs, it is probable that both countries would
bring their nuclear forces to a hair trigger alert, or possibly even prompt the
Israelis to launch a preemptive nuclear attack. The other factor that is liable to
affect Israel’s response is the American response to Iran declaring its nuclear
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capability and whether Israel feels it can depend on Washington for assistance. If
Israel feels that the United States is unreliable or unwilling to help, the more
likely they are to lash out on their own. 99
The next major actor involved in the dispute is the EU-3. This is the
designation for the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and they typically
represent the EU in matters of major foreign policy. These states have been
critical in maintaining the diplomatic avenues into Tehran on the nuclear issue,
especially during the earlier years of the Bush administration, and have tended to
play the “good cop” to America’s “bad cop.” Like the Americans, the EU-3 view
the complete discontinuation of Iran’s full fuel cycle pursuit as the goal, and that
freedom and democratization are the best means to achieve this. However, the
EU-3 viewed the nuclear program as the problem, rather than the American view
that the regime was to blame. 100 However, EU-3 relations with Tehran began
deteriorating in 2005, following Tehran’s dismissal of the EU’s package deal
offer and the election of President Ahmedinejad. The new Iranian President’s
comments about the Holocaust and Israel’s right to exist resulted in an outright
condemnation from the EU, and following Iran’s resumption of enrichment
research in early 2006 the EU-3 stated that the differences were not “between Iran
and Europe, but between Iran and the entire international community.” 101
Furthermore, the EU-3 states are members of the G-8, all of whom came out for
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stronger sanctions against Iran at the March 2010 G-8 summit. These sanctions
are expected to be enacted in the weeks following the summit, provided the UN
Security Council approves. 102 This latest international consensus shows that
exasperation with Iran is no longer a strictly American phenomenon, and that the
Western states are becoming more united on the issue.
The same is not necessarily true for the final two major state actors in the
dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. These are Russia and China, both of whom
have traditionally been Tehran’s major business partners. They have also been
the biggest obstacle to American sanctions on Iran (particularly during the Bush
administration), and have observed a pragmatic relationship with Tehran. Iran
has not made issue of Russian and Chinese suppression of Muslim minorities in
their countries, and this is one of the reasons for this continued partnership. 103
Moscow in particular has maintained strong ties with Tehran since the breakup of
the Soviet Union, and have become one the principal suppliers of arms to Iran (in
exchange for much needed hard currency). Russia has also been at the forefront
of efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue in Iran. The Russian
position vis-à-vis Iran became more in line with the EU-3 during the 2003-2005
period, seeking diplomatic means to resolve the dispute, but making absolutely
clear that the acquisition of nuclear arms by Iran is unacceptable. The most
notable Russian proposal was for Russia to enrich Iranian uranium on Russian
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soil, to prevent or at least delay Iran from developing its own enrichment
ability. 104 However, this deal was not implemented, and recently, Russia has been
falling more and more in line with the American and EU policy regarding Iran,
and has even become more in favor of targeted sanction against Iran’s nuclear
program. However, the Russians have made clear that they do not favor regime
change or sanctions that would disproportionately affect ordinary Iranian citizens.
Furthermore, Lukoil (Russia’s largest private oil firm) recently cancelled a
contract in Iran, citing the effects of sanctions. It even appears that China is
becoming somewhat more open to the prospect of sanctions on Iran, as the Iranian
program becomes more difficult to ignore and Tehran becomes more obstinate. 105
If the development of a nuclear capability exhausts the goodwill of these two
powerful states, Iran will likely find itself utterly isolated and with almost no
strategic partners, either inside or outside the Middle East.
The final important actor in the Iranian nuclear dispute is the International
Atomic Energy Agency. This is the U.N. agency dedicated to the responsible use
of nuclear energy and materials throughout the world. Specifically, the IAEA
uses a variety of inspections (namely ad hoc, routine, special, and safeguards
inspections). It can also use a variety of additional means to verify the nature of a
given nuclear program, such as collecting environmental samples, use of

104

Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, pgs. 108-112.
Reuters, “G8 Increases Pressure on Iran Over Nuclear Program,” New York Times.
Ellen Barry and Andrew Kramer, “China and Russia Pressed Iran to Accept U.N. Deal,” New York
Times, March 24, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/middleeast/25iran.html?scp=14&sq=iran%20nuclear&
st=cse (accessed April 2, 2010).

105

58

remote/unmanned devices to monitor a given facility, and the ability to request
any and all relevant data from the host government. 106 Although this agency has
been responsible for inspecting Tehran’s nuclear industry, there have been a
number of serious hurdles getting the agency involved in the Tehran issue. The
processes used in the creation of the nuclear fuel cycle are dual use technologies,
as either can be used for the creation of fuel for nuclear reactors or for production
of weapons grade uranium. This allows Iran to take advantage of the IAEA’s
mandate to promote the use of peaceful nuclear technology, while still retaining
the ability to construct a nuclear weapon and withdraw from the NPT on short
notice if the need arises. The amount of bureaucratic wrangling and
brinksmanship on the part of the Iranians has also balked the IAEA, and has thus
far only gotten aggressive about verification and inspections after vigorous
American pressure. However, the agency’s independent nature allowed it to
portray itself as an independent entity, which was interested in both Iran’s right to
free energy and satisfying the concerns of the international community. 107
However, it appears that even the good will of the IAEA is nearing exhaustion on
the Iran issue, especially after the exposure of the secret enrichment facility near
Qom. According to the most recent IAEA resolution, the agency has found Iran
to be in violation of multiple sections of the Safeguards Agreement, including the
resumption of enrichment activities, failure to declare its nuclear facilities, and
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has remained highly uncooperative with the agency. The report recommends that
the Director General of the IAEA report these events to the U.N. Security
Council, which has undoubtedly continued to cast Iran in a negative light since. 108

Drivers for Iran’s Nuclear Program
The principal driver for the Iranian nuclear program is generally accepted
to be prestige. Like North Korea, Iran appears to be seeking nuclear weapons (or
at least a nuclear option) as a means of demonstrating its independence and its
ability to increase influence in the Middle East. Another major factor is Iran’s
penchant for vitriolic anti-American sentiment and support for extremist
organizations in the Middle East. Development of an indigenous nuclear program
would cripple American ability to provide security guarantees and general ability
to conduct foreign policy. 109 Furthermore, Iran has repeatedly stated its intention
to become the hegemonic power in the Middle East, and become indispensable to
any and all affairs and regional policies in the Middle East. To do this, they seek
to exploit American entanglement in the region and use a nuclear capability as
leverage over both the United States and the other regional powers. 110 These
regional ambitions fall firmly under the idea of spreading their national influence
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and gaining international prestige, and they clearly view their nuclear program as
a means to achieve this.
The second driver for the Iranian nuclear program is said to be domestic
politics. The Iranian government regularly touts the nuclear program to its
citizenry as both a symbol of national pride and (more importantly) a major
source of continued legitimacy for the current crop of Ideological Conservative
leaders. The current regime is utilizing the program to tap into nationalist
sentiment and present the full nuclear fuel cycle as something “no self-respecting
nation can go without.” 111 The Iranian government continually cites high public
support for nuclear energy as the reason for its continued nuclear development.
The Iranian government has used the issue as evidence that the rest of the world
seeks to deny Iran access to any advanced technologies, and continually reinforce
Iran’s need for a nuclear program in the eyes of its citizens. 112 It has also been
suggested that the recent upheavals following the 2009 presidential elections in
Iran might be impetus to increase the pace on its nuclear program, so as to show
off its nuclear prize and revive the waning political support of the ideological
conservatives. 113 There is precedent for this analysis, as North Korea has
demonstrated similar behavior during the development of its nuclear program.
This could mean that as the Islamic Republic’s domestic political situation
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deteriorates the pace of the Iranian nuclear program could be accelerated in a
desperate bid to keep the regime (or at least the ideological faction) in power.
Technology is the favored public driver of the Iranian government, as the
Iranian government repeatedly states its right to nuclear energy and all portions of
the nuclear fuel cycle. The Iranian government regularly legitimates its pursuit of
nuclear energy as the cornerstone of Iranian national and scientific progress, as
well as a demonstration of its ability to develop nuclear technology in spite of all
international objections. 114 As to whether there is a large scientific lobby in Iran
pushing for the development of nuclear technology, there is no apparent evidence
that the scientific community in Iran has any influence on the policy makers.
Available material suggests that the Iranian mullahs and political elites are the
primary authorities pushing for the development of the nuclear program. 115 In
terms of its technological infrastructure, Iran is becoming dangerously close to the
nuclear threshold. Recent reporting suggests that Iran’s enrichment program is
now capable of producing 19.75% Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), which is the
most significant hurdle in the enrichment process. After reaching this point,
further enriching it to Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is considered to be a
simple exercise. If this is correct, Iran could produce enough material for a
nuclear weapon by 2011 or 2012. 116 With both a strong nuclear infrastructure and
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the call for technological progress by the regime, technology remains a strong
driver for the Iranian nuclear program.
Perversely, security seems to be one of the lesser drivers for the Iranian
nuclear program. Regionally speaking, Iran has very few local security threats to
deal with, and none of them would require a nuclear deterrent. Even Israel, a
current nuclear power, is only likely to present a threat to Iran as long as the
Iranian government continues to combine its insistence on a nuclear program with
its denial of Israel’s right to exist. It is quite clear that Tehran views the United
States as its primary adversary. Furthermore, the strong U.S. presence in both
Iraq and Afghanistan has added to Iran’s threat perception in recent years, fearing
a permanent U.S. presence that could lead to Iran’s permanent isolation. 117 It is
also generally accepted that acquiring nuclear arms would essentially put Iran offlimits to a regime change or invasion, but would do little else to enhance Iran’s
regional security. 118 In all, Iran has little objective rationale to call its security a
significant driver for its nuclear program.
As for the last of Cirincione’s drivers, economics does not appear
significant in the pursuit of a nuclear program for Iran. There is no apparent
evidence that there would be an appreciable economic benefit for Tehran, whether
from the generation of nuclear energy to the sale of HEU (or indeed completed
nuclear weapons) 119. Iran also has scant deposits of uranium within its own
117
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borders, so the Iranian nuclear industry would still be dependent on uranium
imports, which negates any arguments for Iranian nuclear self-sufficiency (and
casts doubt on the intents of the development of the full fuel cycle in Iran). 120
Economic drivers are very minor, and should not be considered to be a major
incentive for Iran to develop its nuclear industry.

Barriers to the Iranian Nuclear Program
Unfortunately, Iran has circumvented the most common barrier to
achieving a nuclear fuel cycle, and this is technology. Early on, Iran had required
significant outside technical assistance to begin construction of its nuclear plant at
Bushehr, and it is widely accepted that Iran acquired its enrichment centrifuges
though the black market. By this point, however, Iran has managed to construct
several enrichment facilities (such as those at Natanz and Qom), and it appears to
have sufficient technical know-how to maintain and possibly even improve the
centrifuges they have acquired or manufactured. 121 Furthermore, the nuclear
plant at Bushehr is slated to finally begin operating in the summer of 2010, which
would firmly cement Iran’s nuclear capability. 122 If Iran’s ability to create LEU
at Natanz can also be confirmed, the operation of Bushehr with fuel enriched at
Natanz or Qom would firmly cement Iran as a nuclear state. Therefore,
technology is no longer a significant barrier to the Iranian nuclear program.

Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” pgs. 37-38.
120
Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, pg. 26.
121
Albright and Walrond, “Supplement to Iran's Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock,” ISIS.
122
Barry and Kramer, “China and Russia Pressed Iran to Accept U.N. Deal,” New York Times.

64

Interestingly, probably the greatest existing barrier to the Iranian nuclear
program is security. Iran is bringing extreme security risks onto itself by insisting
on the fuel cycle and the continuation of its nuclear program. Chief among these
is Israel. Israel is commonly accepted as the country that is most likely to strike
Iran over its nuclear issue, since Israel regards this program as an existential
threat, particularly from a state that denies Israel’s right to exist. Whether Iran
actually intends to destroy Israel with atomic arms is becoming less relevant; the
Israeli public is becoming increasingly convinced that they are, and are becoming
increasingly vocal in their demands for a preemptive strike. Eventually, it may
come to pass that Israel will strike Iran due to public outcry even if the United
States and the Israeli Mossad try to restrain such a strike. 123 The other principal
security risk to Iran resulting from its nuclear program is the United States itself.
The American stance regarding Iran has been clear: Iran must cease its uranium
enrichment and submit to IAEA inspections on its nuclear program. 124
Furthermore, the election of President Obama has done little to weaken the
American stance on the issue. As of March 2010 the President is pressing for
tougher sanctions on Iran, and is working diligently to bring Russia and China in
closer to the American position. 125 American willingness to respond with force is
uncertain, even if Iran does develop a full-fledged nuclear arsenal. However, it
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seems unlikely that the United States is going to put the use of force off the table
entirely.
Economics will also provide a significant barrier to the Iranian nuclear
program. This is especially true in regards to Iran’s supply of uranium. Iran is
not self-sufficient in uranium mining, and probably will not be so until after 2015
at least. 126 This leaves a critical weakness in the Iranian nuclear program and
makes the Iranian nuclear program very vulnerable to having its supplies of
uranium cut off in the short term (either directly or through denial of hard
currency through sanctions). The potential effects of sanctions are also not
something that can be underestimated, especially if Russia and China sign off on
them in the UNSC. There are already signs that the growing international
pressure is starting to have an effect on investments in Iran. Lukoil’s pullout from
the Anaran oil field in Iran is an important indicator that Iran is becoming
unpalatable to foreign investors. Although Russian state firm Gazprom has
picked up the Anaran contract, a shift of private foreign direct investment out of
Iran should have a major effect on the country and its nuclear program. 127
Tehran clearly views the nuclear program as a means of enhancing its
international prestige, but both historical precedent and recent changes in the
international political climate suggest that the reverse effect is the more likely.
Iran is more likely to find itself totally isolated and considered a rogue state in
every sense of the term. South Africa found itself in the same situation (as stated
126
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earlier) and was cooperatively sanctioned by both the United States and the Soviet
Union. 128 South Africa was treated as a pariah for the entirety of its nucleararmed period and did not gain international prestige and respect until it
unilaterally disarmed its arsenal. Additionally, Russia and China are becoming
more open to sanctions on Iran, particularly if they develop nuclear arms, and
developing nuclear weapons would likely isolate Iran from these two important
supporters. 129 If Iran finds itself in this situation, it will find itself alienated and
without any foreign influence to peddle. It will most likely be unable to affect
major policies in the neighboring states, which both distrust Iran and are likely to
turn to the United States for security. 130 Therefore, international prestige may be
considered a driver from the perspective of the Iranian government, but from a
more objective standpoint it should be considered a barrier, since Iran stands to
lose a great deal of international standing by proceeding with its nuclear program.
Finally, the domestic politics issue could end up being the barrier that
ultimately brings down the Iranian nuclear program. The Iranian government
regularly flaunts the overwhelming public support for the nuclear program as
evidence that it must proceed with its nuclear program. However, the government
ignores or obfuscates many of the facts regarding public support of the program.
While 80% of the Iranian public supports Iranian nuclear program, most of the
Iranian public also do not support nuclear development if it isolates Iran like
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North Korea has been. Iranian citizens do not support the nuclear program if it
detracts from domestic political needs, and appear unwilling to endure the same
economic consequences that Pakistan and North Korea have suffered as results of
their nuclear ambitions. 131 The riots following the rigged elections in 2009
demonstrate the inherent instability and potential for unrest in Iran if the public
feels disenfranchised by the government. If the Iranian public eventually comes
to feel that the nuclear program puts their interests at risk, then there is the
possibility of further unrest. The question then will be if the current political
elites choose to adapt to its citizens demands or if reforms will be necessary.

Conclusions
Given that Iran faces a much greater number of barriers towards
developing a nuclear program instead of drivers, it seems apparent that the Iranian
government is bent on having its nuclear industry, regardless of the costs at home
and abroad. The continuing breakdowns in relations between Iran and the
Western countries show the growing indifference of Tehran to global opinion, and
Iranian refusals to accept fuel deals proposed even by long-time business partner
Russia illustrate the level of importance Iran places on attaining the complete
nuclear fuel cycle. While moderate elements do exist in Iran that would likely be
amenable to a compromise, as long as the ideologues remain in power Iran is
unlikely to make any sort of concessions on its nuclear program, which greatly
131
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reduces any chance of a diplomatic resolution before Iran gains a nuclear
capability. When compared to the historical examples stated above, very few of
the factors that resulted in positive outcomes such as South Africa and Libya are
present. Unlike the Libyans, Iran has not been sufficiently isolated to make
negotiations effective, nor has it been offered any significant incentives to
abandon its nuclear program (those that have been proposed are usually dismissed
by the ideologues dismiss as insulting). Unlike South Africa, Iran has no ongoing
regional conflict that would warrant a nuclear arsenal, although their concerns
regarding American encirclement could be considered analogous to South African
concerns about growing Soviet influence in Africa.
Of the NPT failures, Iran bears the most resemblance to India and North
Korea. It does not mandate nuclear arms for deterrence like Pakistan does.
Similar to North Korea, Iran does seek recognition as a regional power player
through its nuclear program, but Iran tends to be more pragmatic in its policy than
North Korea. Also like North Korea, Iran likely views its nuclear program as a
means of legitimizing the current leadership of the Islamic Republic. However,
Iran’s main argument is that it has the right to nuclear technology and the full
nuclear fuel cycle, and that the existing nuclear powers are conspiring to prevent
this. Lack of punishment in the cases of India, Pakistan, and North Korea may be
encouraging the Iranian effort as well. If Iran is going to be deterred from its
nuclear ambitions, it has to be shown that those developments will not go
unpunished.
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Chapter VI-Conclusions:
Iran’s current determination to pursue the nuclear fuel cycle in the face of
all international opinion and demands for transparency provide a strong refutation
to this work’s central hypothesis: A diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear
dispute remains unlikely, barring a major shift in Iranian politics or government.
If the moderates in the Iranian political elite can regain the more prominent
political roles, a deal might be possible. The common consensus is that the
Iranian nuclear program has reached a point where even a military intervention
will only be able to delay the Iranian program rather than destroy it. 132
If this is the case, why does Iran, like North Korea, choose to pursue this
program when doing defies all conventional logic? Iran stands to lose a great deal
from continuing its pursuit of the full fuel cycle, from allies and prestige to hard
currency and military support, with few real concrete benefits from developing
the program. Even ideology and the historic animosity between the leadership of
the Islamic Republic and the Western states do not explain pursuing a program
that offers such a poor cost-to-benefit ratio. Yet this trend seems to be becoming
more common, as both Iran and North Korea are pursuing their nuclear programs
132
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in the face of fierce opposition from abroad. The answer appears to reside within
of Cirinicione’s fifth driver: Domestic politics, and more specifically, regime
survival. Both Iran and North Korea have tenuous regimes, which both rely on
deception of the public through huge amounts of propaganda, military strength,
and use of force against dissidents to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of their
citizens. Both governments tout their nuclear programs as a vital national interest,
and blame the rest of the international community for their internal problems.
The Korean case in particular demonstrates a society that has been forced to
accept famine and crushing poverty for a nuclear program, believing that their
country will be invaded and annihilated without them.
Iran’s circumstance is better in some ways, but more tenuous in others.
As it stands, Iran still retains a great deal of international business and its citizens
are nowhere near as impoverished as those in North Korea. However, Iranian
citizens are far more educated than those in the DPRK, and are both aware of
what has happened to the people of North Korea and unwilling to let the same
happen to them. For this reason, Tehran has no choice but to walk an extremely
delicate tightrope. They must continue their nuclear program to gain their nuclear
option and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian people, but they must
maintain enough plausible deniability about the nature program to avoid global
sanctions (or a military intervention) from the international community. It seems
clear that Tehran believes that any deviation from this course could bring the
downfall of the ideological faction, or even the Islamic Republic as a whole.
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This brings this study to an important realization regarding Iran’s nuclear
program, and more importantly, a major insight as to the main motivations of
potential proliferation states. During the course of this study, all of the states that
chose to produce nuclear arms (with the possible exception of India) all had a
common characteristic: they were deemed as absolutely critical to the survival of
the government at the time. Pakistan viewed nuclear arms as a dire necessity to
prevent an assault by a nuclear armed India. South Africa initially produced its
nuclear arms to deter aggressors on its borders and expanding Soviet influence in
Africa. Both North Korea and Iran appear to be pursuing their programs to
legitimize their regimes domestically and deter potential enemies abroad. By
contrast, both Libya and South Africa gave up their weapons programs once it
became clear that those weapons were greater threats to their national security
than guarantors of it. Regime survival appears to be the most critical
driver/barrier of all when it comes to nuclear arms, whether it is survival against
external threats or internal dissent.
With it becoming evident that the Iranian program has likely progressed
too far to stop and that Iran views the attainment of the full fuel cycle as critical to
its survival both at home and abroad, the main hypothesis of this work appears to
have been proven. In spite of all costs and potential risks, Iran pursues its
program with single-minded determination, out of the belief that the completion
of their nuclear industry is necessary to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of
their public and demonstrate Iran’s might to the Middle East. Similar experiences
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with North Korea, South Africa, and Pakistan reinforce this finding. If a regime
believes that its survival can be guaranteed by a nuclear program, it is liable to
pursue that program until either it brings that program to fruition, or until it
becomes evident that possessing nuclear arms is a greater risk to that regime’s
survival than not having them.
If the ideologues believe that the current course with the nuclear program
has to be maintained for the sake of the survival of their regime, this will make
the negotiation of a diplomatic settlement nearly impossible. This is especially
true when combined with the ideologues’ intrinsic animosity towards the United
States and indifference to global opinion. With this in mind, it appears that the
best strategy for the United States to implement in this scenario is a two phase
plan. The first phase involves delaying the Iranian nuclear program by covert
methods as much as possible. This is combined with outreach efforts to the
moderates in the Iranian government and attempts to demonstrate to Iranian
citizens the inherent dangers involved in pursuing the full fuel cycle. The goal is
to delay the nuclear fuel cycle program from being completed until more
moderate/pragmatic actors can return to prominence in the Islamic Republic,
while retaining a measure of plausible deniability for the United States. Finally,
the U.S. has to keep Israel restrained and prevent it from launching a preemptive
strike.
However, the United States needs to anticipate that a more moderate
faction may not be elected in the near future in Iran, and that Iran’s nuclear
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program could be completed during that time. The second phase involves
containment of Iran after having declared full nuclear fuel cycle capability and
preventing the crisis from escalating into a regional nuclear standoff. Deterrence
of Iranian regional and nuclear ambitions in this scenario is the key component of
this type of containment. Deterrence may seem difficult to enforce against a state
like Iran, but works like After Iran Gets the Bomb by James Lindsay and Ray
Takeyh demonstrate several effective means for the United States to limit Iranian
attempts to exploit its nuclear gains. This work also discusses the policy options
to be avoided by the United States if Iran gets a nuclear option, in addition to
mitigating the inevitable damage done to confidence in American defense
guarantees to regional states and its ability to keep Iran under control.

Proposed Policy Plan
Creating a foreign policy framework should be based upon the idea that
regime survival is the most important factor in the continued development of a
nuclear program. Therefore, a regime that views its survival as threatened (either
from within or without) is likely to push for the completion of a nuclear program,
and is more likely to abandon the program once it realizes that there is much to be
gained from cooperation with the international community. This is especially
likely in the Iranian case, as Tehran is known to be a fairly pragmatic actor in
regards to many of its politics. In order to do business with Russia and China,
Tehran ignores the oppression of ethnic Muslim minorities in either country, and
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in spite of its inflammatory rhetoric against the United States and Israel, it has
taken great pains to not directly provoke either. This suggests that the Islamic
Republic can be considered a rational enough actor to be subject to this sort of
cost-benefit analysis.
However, until Tehran can be shown to have fully completed their fuel
cycle and are capable of producing weapons grade uranium, American options are
rather limited. At best, the United States can try to delay the program through
diplomatic and covert methods until the moderates can return to power in Tehran.
The latter method in particular has proven effective, by enticing Iranian nuclear
scientists to defect to the United States and by seeding the black market with
defective centrifuge parts to delay Iranian progress in establishing their
enrichment plants. 133 However, unless the moderate faction can regain power in
Iranian politics quickly, it is unlikely that delaying the program in this manner
will buy sufficient amounts of time. Given the distributed nature of the Iranian
program, it is generally accepted that even a preemptive military strike will only
delay the Iranian efforts, and would likely galvanize support for the ideological
faction in Tehran.
However, American options expand considerably after Iran has completed
its fuel cycle. Granted, the United States will have lost a significant amount of
diplomatic credibility, especially with the other states of the Middle East, but it
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should still be possible to reign in the situation as long as the U.S. acts
responsibly and decisively. This is also the best time to demonstrate to Iran the
extreme costs of pursuing the program, and there are a number of ways to perform
this. Considering that prestige and economics appear to be the best means of
inducing a country to give up a nuclear capability, these should form the
cornerstone of all U.S. efforts. Iran would need to be utterly isolated politically
from as many dealings in the Middle East as possible. Attempts to promote
regional integration on security and economic issues in the Middle East should be
made, with the deliberate exclusion of Tehran. The development of a full fuel
cycle would likely cause Russia and China to sever their ties with Iran, which
would aid in the implementation of sanctions, and would alienate Iran from its
principal providers of armaments and foreign investment. Cutting off supplies of
foreign uranium to Iran would also starve their fledgling nuclear industry of fuel,
further crippling the program. One suggestion that has merit (but is also highly
ambitious) is the deliberate inclusion of Syria in the Israeli/Palestinian peace
process, again deliberately excluding Tehran. 134 Finally, efforts should be made
to inform the citizens of Iran of the problems caused by the single-minded pursuit
of nuclear energy by the ideological faction. The growing amount of
technological prowess among Iranian citizens, especially among dissidents and
protestors, makes the delivery of information to the Iranian populace that much
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more expedient. 135 Communities of Iranian expatriates should be considered to
aid in this particular effort. The goal is to demonstrate to Tehran that the costs of
its program are indeed far higher than they think, and to demonstrate that if they
continue with the nuclear program, the security of their regime will be threatened,
either from internal dissidents or external states. In the end, the idea is to either
cause the regime to fold on the nuclear issue and ensure its own survival, or cause
its downfall and bring about the election of a more moderate national actor.
However, there are two important caveats to this scenario. The first of
these is that the United States must prevent Israel from launching a preemptive
attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities, and refrain from doing so itself. It is
widely accepted that an Israeli first-strike would do more harm than good, merely
delaying the Iranian program and uniting the Iranian citizens under the banner of
the ideological faction. If the regime survival approach is to work, Iran cannot be
provided with a means to unify its populace against an outside aggressor. On the
other hand, however, the United States should be prepared to use force against
Iran in the event that Iran does complete its fuel cycle (or even develop actual
nuclear arms). Clearly, this should be a last resort scenario, but if Iran begins
using its nuclear card as a means to act belligerently to its neighboring states
(either through threat of terrorism, conventional attack, or nuclear attack) the
United States needs to be prepared to act appropriately. Also necessary to
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utilizing the regime survival method is containing Iran in this case, eliminating
the belief that they can use the threat of force as regional leverage after gaining
their nuclear option (or weapons). 136

Closing Comments
This study has come to the conclusion that a strictly diplomatic solution
with the Iranian government is unlikely under the current circumstances, and with
the completion of Iran’s fuel cycle considered only a matter of time, American
options are becoming increasingly limited. However, the research does suggest
that a military solution is not a necessity either. Delaying the Iranian program
through covert means could delay the program for enough time until the
moderates in the Iranian political apparatus can return to power. If this happens,
the United States should not hesitate to reopen negotiations on the nuclear issue.
These methods could also help prevent an Israeli preemptive strike, which would
likely have a severe regional backlash. However, the United States should also
not hesitate to act decisively if Iran gains a nuclear capability or actually builds a
nuclear weapon. It must be made clear immediately that Iran’s development of
nuclear capability is absolutely unacceptable, and containment/reduction of
Iranian regional influence should prove to Tehran the inherent risks of possessing
a nuclear capability. As long as it is made clear that possession of nuclear arms
will pose a greater threat to Iran’s future than having them, Iran is likely to back
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off. A military response by the United States and the other Western states is
something that should be avoided as much as possible, but the U.S. should not
hesitate to employ a military response if Iran becomes too aggressive as a result of
its nuclear capability. Finally, the United States has to make clear that any further
development of nuclear arms in the Middle East is absolutely unacceptable, and
be ready to cut off aid to any partner states in the Middle East that consider
building or buying their own nuclear arms. If the United States acts both
decisively and responsibly, a nuclear Iran need not escalate into a doomsday
scenario in the Middle East.
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